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Abstract
This paper deals with competition in communications markets between an incum-
bent and an entrant. We analyze the effect of bundling strategy by a firm who enters
an incumbent market. This market dimension has profound implications on the sus-
tainability of collusion in an infinitely repeated game framework. We show that the
bundling strategy of the entrant might hinder collusion. Futhermore, we consider a set-
ting in which the entrant uses a one-way access that the incumbent possesses. In such
situation, we show that when the entrant bundles its products, a low access charge for
call termination on the incumbent network might increase the feasibility of collusion.
This result has an important policy implication.
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1 Introduction
Technological convergence appears to be well underway in the telecommunications indus-
try. Several recent studies indicate that convergence facilitates the comparison of service
offerings and intensifies competition between companies. Convergence is also changing the
practices adopted by firms in terms of the pricing and structure of their service offerings.
To reduce the intensity of competition, firms are pursuing strategies of price discrimination
between consumers. As a result, companies are multiplying their bundles or tied offers that
incorporate complementary or substitutable goods. Competitive pressure and changing con-
sumption habits are encouraging firms to market bundles of services that include telephony,
internet access and television. There are several goals behind this strategy, which vary de-
pending on the type of player offering the bundles. For instance, bundling strategies can
allow entrants to win market share and incumbents to offset losses in revenues.
The implications of convergence not only shape competition and pricing systems, but
also lead to organisational convergence (see Bauer (2005)). Insofar as firms offering bundles
of services do not historically come from the same markets, they do not have the same
skills or core competences, and therefore do not have access to facilities enabling them
to offer these services under the same conditions. The positioning of different firms in
terms of the offering of service bundles effectively depends heavily on their core competence.
Strategies of extending offerings consequently do not share the same dynamic: telecom
operators are looking to expand their offerings to television, whereas cable operators are
adopting strategies of extending their offers to telephony and high-speed Internet access
services.
Changes in the sector are raising interesting questions regarding aspects of competition.
Major issues are the impacts of bundling offers both on the competitive behavior of firms
and access regulation. From this point of view, the entrance of cable operators into the
telecommuniactions markets is one of interesting example. During the last years, cable
operators have upgraded their cable network infrastructure to facilitate two-way data and
voice transport for cable Internet services. However, given the costs of new network de-
ployments, cable operators could choose to extend their coverage via local loop unbundling
rather than by building new cable. Hence, even if cable operators have a strong market
power on TV market, they might buy essential facilities for broadband Internet access from
telecom firms1. In addition, the development of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) allows
1For example, the UK’s newly merged main cable operator ntl:Telewest has stated its intention to extend
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cable operators to enter into telephony markets and to compete hardly the incumbent who
offers the telephony over PSTN. Moreover, with VoIP incumbents have to deal with com-
petition with new upstart firms2 offering VoIP services. Hence, anyone with a broadband
connection (DSL or cable) can subscribe to a VoIP provider and make phone calls at a low
rate.
This recent trend towards convergence raises interesting questions for the role of bundling
on competition in telecommunications markets. For example, to what extent does compe-
tition in bundles require us to rethink the question of regulating access? Does the entrant
have an incentive to use bundling to extend its market power? How does the easiness of
collusion in such industries change with bundling? In this context, what is the role of access
charge?
The recent literature on telecommunications competition and access regulation have been
focuses in situations of two-way access (Armstrong (1998), Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a,b),
De Bilj and Peitz (2002) or Vogelsang (2003)). De Bilj and Peitz (2006) build a model on
that litterature and analyze the emergence of VoIP networks in a PSTN environment. They
focus on the effect of access regulation of PSTN networks on the adoption of VoIP. In
particular, they show that higher prices for terminating access to the PSTN network make
VoIP less likely to succeed. Shim and Oh (2006) analyze the incentive for an entrant firm (a
cable operator) to bundle services when entering the broadband Internet service market and
competing with the incumbent in a one-way access problem. In this setting, they examine
the question of access regulation. The main result suggests that this market dimension could
be profitably introduced in the design of access charge by policy makers and regulators.
Our paper focuses on the relationship between bundling and the feasibility of collusion
when a telecom firm compete with a newcomer who has a strong market power on a tying
market. The new entrant is either a firm with a full-coverage network or a provider who
uses local loop unbundling to reach end-users.
During the last two decades, bundling has become an intensive research topic for Indus-
trial Organization. Whinston (1990) clarifies the various aspects of bundling strategies and
their antitrust issues3. More recently, Stole (2003) gives an interesting overview on bundling.
This literature developed with legal actions against Microsoft because many economists con-
its reach via local loop unbundling of BT lines (Ofcom (2006)).
2Alternative operators (Yahoo!BB, Time Warner, Free, Fastweb...) or pure VoIP service providers (eBay-
Skype, Google, Yahoo!...).
3 See Adams and Yellen (1976) and McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989).
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sider that bundling has been the main driver for the development of Microsoft (Nalebuff
(2000), Economides (2001)). This theoretical literature looks primarily at two cases. The
first case corresponds to that of a monopolist who is threatened by an entrant and uses
bundling or tying as a substitute to discrimination and to capture more consumer surplus
(for instance, see Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999)). The second case corresponds to that of
an incumbent threatened by an outsider for whom bundling (or tying) is used as a means
to foreclose entry (Rey and Tirole (2005)). A more recent literature, in line with Matutes
and Regibeau (1988, 1992) and Economides (1993), analyses competition between firms that
offer bundles. In particular, Reisinger (2004) shows that the consequences of bundling are
less predictable in the duopoly than in the monopoly because the traditional “sorting effect”
is in balance with a “business-stealing” effect4 .
Although a lot of economic literature exists on bundling, this has not given rise to many
papers on the relationship between bundling and collusion. Yet the existing relationship
to bundling would seem to lie in the ability of firms to sustain collusion. Our framework
aims to clarify that relationship and identify the lessons to be learnt in terms of antitrust
policy. It will subsequently offer relevant economic arguments regarding the justification of
regulating firms’ content offerings and access regulation.
Papers initiated by Whinston (1990) have shown that the profitability of bundling results
from economies of scale in the tied market. Other papers (Carbajo et al. (1990), Seidmann
(1991) and Chen (1997)) have shown that bundling may mitigate competition by inducing
more differentiation. In an infinitly repeated game, Spector (2006) shows that the anticom-
petitive use of bundling is possible even in the absence of economies of scale or scope in
the tied market. The mechanism from which the bundling can mitigate competition is that
bundling is a tool allowing firms to shift from non-cooperation to collusion. Spector( 2006)
claims that if collusion is feasible in the tied market, bundling may be a profitable strategy
because it may facilitate collusion.
In this paper, we consider a model of competition with horizontal differentiation in the
tied market between an incumbent and an entrant. The incumbent possesses a complete local
access network and offers PSTN telephony. The entrant offers the Internet services (VoIP
and TV services) with a full-coverage broadband network or using local loop unbundling
to reach end-users. In this context, we examine how the feasibility of collusion in the tied
market depends on the new upstart firm’s offer strategy (bundling or not bundling). In order
4Other papers analyze competition with bundling, see, among others, Choi (2003a, 2003b) and, Choi and
Stefanadis (2001).
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to focus both on the impact of bundling and regulation of access, we abstract from problems
associated with the pricing of call termination. When the entrant offers a bundle, we show
that differentiation might reduce the ability of firms to sustain the collusive equilibrium.
In this setting, bundling might hinder collusion if it sufficiently rises the degree of product
differentiation. When the bundling firm uses a one-way access that incumbent possesses,
access charge might reduce the feasibility of collusion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
examines the sustainability of collusion in the benchmark case where firms choose indepen-
dent pricing. In Section 3, we consider pure bundling and we compare the condition of
sustainability with the benchmark case. In section 4, we introduce a one-way access model
and we examine the impact of access charge on collusion. Conclusion appears in Section 5.
2 The framework
2.1 The model
We consider two independent markets, market X and market Y , and we assume that the
two products can be consumed independently. There are two firms, an entrant (firm A)
and an incumbent (firm B). The incumbent owns a complete local access network. In this
section, we suppose that the entrant has its own local network and thus can operate with a
full-coverage broadband network.
Consumers have a unit demand for each product. The market for product X is mo-
nopolised by firm A. Consumers have valuation of α for product X and the unit cost of
production for firm A is cx. We normalize cx to 0 and we suppose that α > 0.
The market for product Y is served by firm A and firm B. The two firms are engaged
in price competition. Suppose that their unit cost for product Y are the same and given by
cy. We normalize cy to 0. We assume that product Y is differentiated à la Hotelling. We
denote the location of a consumer on a unit interval by y, y ∈ [0, 1], in which consumers
are uniformly distributed. The reservation value for product Y is normalized to 1. The two
firms are located at the end points of the unit interval and we assume that firm A is located
at yA = 0 and firm B at yB = 1.
Let us assume that firm i charges consumers with price pi for product Y . The utility of
a consumer located at y who would subscribe to firm i is represented as:
Ui = 1− pi − t |y − yi| with i = A,B (1)
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For simplicity, we only consider the full market coverage case. In addition, we assume
a non-negative market share conditions for firms A and B in order to further specify the
range of the model parameters.
The analysis follows the standard repeated-game treatment of collusion. We assume that
firms use the "trigger strategy’ of Friedman (1971) where δ is the rate of time preference of
both firms, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. This strategy is described as follows. Firms charge collusive prices
if neither firm has deviated in a previous stage. However, if either firm deviates, then both
firms revert forever to the Nash equilibrium. Hence, firm i sticks to the collusive price if:
πci
1− δ ≥ π
d
i +
δπ∗i
1− δ (IC)
where π∗i , πci and πdi are the one-shot Nash, collusive and deviation profits of firm i
respectively.
The incentive compatibility constraint (IC) faced by firm i gives a condition on the rate
of time preference:
δ ≥ π
d
i − πci
πdi − π∗i
(2)
Each firm is then willing to stick to the collusive price if this rate is sufficently large. The
collusive prices constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game if
and only if δ ≥ max
i=A,B
δi.
The timing of the game is described as follows. In the first stage, firm A decides whether
or not she will bundle products X and Y . This decision is irreversible5. If she decides to
bundle, firm A will offer a pair combining one unit of product X and one unit of product Y .
If she decides not to bundle, she will offer the two products X and Y alone. In the second
stage, firms interact in an infinitely repeated game framework by setting simultaneously
prices for the products they sell. The game is solved by backward induction.
2.2 The benchmark : Independent pricing
As a benchmark, suppose that no bundled agreements have been made. Consumers will make
their choice over the two products independently. We consider the possibility of sustaining
collusion in the repeated-game using Nash reversion trigger strategies.
Firstly, consider the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. Firm A can extract the whole
consumer surplus in market X with a price equal to α, and have a profit α.
5 Spector (2006) examines the robustness of the result when bundling decision is reversible. Other things
equal, reversibility should not contradict the result.
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The marginal consumer for product Y will be located at by such that:
1− tby − pA = 1− t(1− by)− pB
⇔ by = 1
2
+
1
2t (pB − pA)
(3)
Thus, all consumers located at y ≤ by purchase Y from firm A while all other consumers
purchase from firm B.
Each firm, i = A,B, simultaneously and independently sets prices to maximise profits:
max
pi
pi(
1
2
+
1
2t (pj − pi)) (4)
In the unique Nash equilibrium, prices are given by p∗A = p∗B = t with one half of
consumers buying product Y from firm A and the rest buying this product from firm B.
It should be noted that at equilibrium, both firms serve the market6 and the full market
coverage condition7 requires t ≤ 2/3. Given this, the profits of firms for product Y are
π∗A = π∗B = t2 and the total profit for firm A is Π∗A = α+
t
2 .
Let us now calculate the prices and the profits under collusion and deviation respectively.
When firms collude, they set prices to maximise the joint profit. The collusive prices for
market Y are given by pcA = pcB = 1 − 12 t and the joint profit is πc = 1 −
1
2 t. If the firms
adhere to the collusive agreement, each firm earns the collusive payoff:
πcA = πcB =
1
2
µ
1− 1
2
t
¶
(5)
It should be noted that when firms collude the full market coverage condition is satisfied.
The price set by firm i that deviates from the collusive equilibrium when the other firm
sticks to it can be obtained as the solution of the following program: max
pA
πi(pi, pcj).
From the first order condition, we obtain the deviation price for firm i:
pdi =
1
4
(2 + t)
and the deviation profit for firm i is:
πdi =
1
32t(2 + t)
2
6The non-negative market share conditions for firms A and B is pB − t ≤ pA ≤ pB + t which is verified
at equilibrium.
7We obtain the full market coverage with: 1− ty − p∗A = 1− t(1− y)− p∗B ≥ 0
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When a firm deviates from the collusive equilibrium, the non-negative market share
conditions require8 that t ≥ 2
7
.
Lemma 1 (i) The critical discount factor that makes collusion feasible in market Y is:
δ ≥ δ∗ = 2− 3t
2 + 5t
(ii) The feasibility of collusion is increasing with product differentiation.
Proof. Substituting the equilibrium values of profits into (2), we obtain the result.
When product differentiation increases, collusion becomes easier to sustain. In the limit,
if t = 2/3, δ∗ = 0 and collusion is always feasible. This is a traditional result in the models
of collusion in an infinitely repeated framework with horizontally differentiated products9.
The intuition of this classical result is simple. The discount factor above which collusion is
sustainable depends on two effects : a deviation effect, (πdi − πci ), and a punishment effect,
(πdi −π∗i ). Both the benefit from deviating and the loss from punishment are decreasing with
differentiation. It is clear that differentiation decreases the benefit from deviating because
firms have more market power. Moreover, differentiation decreases the benefit from collusion
because the punishment profit (Nash profit) increases whereas the collusion profit is dragged
down. However, when differentiation increases, the benefit from deviating decreases faster
than loss from punishment. In consequence, an increase in product differentiation makes a
deviation from the collusive path less likely.
3 Pure bundling and collusion
In the previous section we were concerned with the feasibility of collusion when fims choose
independent pricing. In this section we consider the case where firm A offers a bundle
combining in a fixed proportion of product X and product Y .
In the case of pure bundling, the consumer has only two choices: he can either buy the
product Y from firm B or buy the bundle (one unit of product X and one unit of product
Y ) from firm A. We assume that when a consumer buys a bundle, he cannot consume
one product (product A) and buy the other product (B) from the competing firm. This
assumption can be related to compatibility. Here, as in Matutes and Regibeau (1992),
bundling is a way to make its products incompatible with the product of firm B.
8This condition is given by 2−3t
2
≤ pdi ≤
2+t
2
.
9 See, among others, Chang (1991).
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Let epA denote the price of the bundle offered by firm A and epB the price of product
Y from firm B. We suppose that the bundling strategy of firm A modifies the degree of
differentiation between the two products offered by firms. We note τ the transportation cost
and we assume that τ = βt, where β > 1. This assumption means that bundling reduces
the degree of substituability between the two competing products.
Consumers have valuation of α+1 if he buys the bundled product. For the convenience
of analysis, we put restrictions on parameters to ensure both full market coverage and
non-negative market shares under collusion, deviation and non-cooperative equilibriums
(see Appendix 1). Notice that these restrictions require α ≤ 2 and β ∈ [β, β], where
β = 5α+414t and β =
α+4
6t . Following the first condition, we consider that the difference
between consumers’ valuation of the two independent goods (X and Y ) is relatively limited.
If α > 1 (respectively, < 1), consumers’ valuation for product X is higher (respectively,
lower) than for product Y . It should be noted that if α = 0, consumers value in the same
manner the bundle offered by firm A and the product Y offered by firm B. The difference
with the benchmark case is then only about the degree of substitution between the two offers.
The condition on parameter β ensures that differentiation between the bundle offered by
firm A and the product Y offered by firm B always allows a duopoly equilibrium with full
market coverage.
For the bundled product to be choosen by the consumer located at b, epA and epB should
satisfy the following condition:
α+ 1− epA − τb ≥ 1− epB − τ(1− b)
We can derive the demand function for each firm as:
bA =
α− epA + epB + βt
2βt and bB = 1− bA
These yield the following profits:
πA = epAα− epA + epB + βt
2βt and πB = epB epA − epB + βt− α2βt
As in the previous section, we determine the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium and the
prices and profits under collusion and deviation repectively.
In the non-cooperative game, firms set prices to maximize their profits. The equilibrium
prices are:
ep∗A = βt+ α3 and ep∗B = βt− α3 .
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The equilibrium profits are:
eπ∗A = (3βt+ α)218βt and eπ∗B = (3βt− α)218βt (6)
We now calculate the prices and the profits under collusion and deviation respectively.
When firms collude, they set prices which capture entirely the surplus of consumers.
This prices are given by epA = α+ 1− τb and epB = 1− τ(1− b). Firms determine market
shares to maximizes the joint profit with respect to b:
max
b
eΠc = (α+ 1− βtb) b+ (1− βt+ βtb) (1− b)
Finally, under collusion the market share for firm A and firm B are:
ebcA = 12 + α4βt and ebcB = 12 − α4βt
The collusive prices are:
epcA = 1 + 34α− βt2 and epcB = 1 + α4 − βt2 .
We can thus deduce easily the profits of firms when they collude:
eπcA = (3α+ 4− 2βt) (2βt+ α)16βt and eπcB = (α+ 4− 2βt) (2βt− α)16βt (7)
When firm i deviates from the collusive equilibrium, she takes as given the collusive
price of its rival and sets price to maximize its profit. The deviation prices for firm A and
B respectively are then given by:
epdA = 12 + 5α8 − βt4 and epB = 12 − α8 + βt4 .
The profits after deviation are given by:
eπdA = (4 + 5α+ 2βt)2128βt and eπdB = (4− α+ 2βt)2128βt (8)
Using (2) together with (6), (7) and (8) we can conclude that collusive prices are sus-
tainable under bundling if δ ≥ max(eδA,eδB), where:
eδA = 9(4 + α− 6βt)2
(12 + 30βt+ 23α)(12− 18βt+ 7α)eδB = 9(4 + 3α− 6βt)2
(12 + 5α− 18βt)(12− 11α+ 30βt)
We now turn to the impact of a change in the differentiation parameter β on the threshold
values eδA and eδ. The standard result shows that differentiation increases the feasibility of
10
collusion. We show here that bundling matters for the relationship between differentiation
and the feasibility of collusion.
Let us determine the impact of a change in the differentiation parameter β on the thresh-
old values eδA and eδB . The comparative statics on eδA and eδB give:
∂eδA(α, β)
∂β = 1728
β (α+ 4− 6βt)
¡
−9α2 − 19α+ 12αβt− 12 + 18βt
¢
(−7α− 12 + 18βt)2 (23α+ 12 + 30βt)2
∂eδB(α, β)
∂β = 1728
β (−6βt+ 3α+ 4)
¡
6αβt+ 18βt− 2α2 − 5α− 12
¢
(−5α− 12 + 18βt)2 (−11α+ 12 + 30βt)2
Since β ≤ β, it is easy to show that ∂
eδA(α, t)
∂β ≤ 0.
The impact of differentiation on the critical discount factor for firm B is quite ambiguous.
Notice that the denominator of
∂eδB(α, β)
∂β is positive. Since β ≤ β, it is easy to show that
(−6βt+ 3α+ 4) > 0. Let put β1 =
2α2 + 5α+ 12
6t(α+ 3) . Then for any β ∈ [β1, β], (6αβt +
18βt− 2α2 − 5α− 12) is positive.
The following Lemma summerizes the impact of differentiation on the critical discount
factors.
Lemma 2 Differentiation between the two offers:
(i) decreases the critical discount factor for firm A
(ii) increases the critical discount factor for firm B if β ≥ β1
As noted above, differentiation has two effects on the critical discount factors: an effect
on the loss from punishment and an effect on the benefit from deviating. For the firm which
offers the bundle, differentiation increases its incentive to sustain a collusive equilibrium.
Then, for firm A we obtain the classical effect of differentiation on the critical discount
factor. In contrast, the incentive of firm B to sustain the collusive equilibrium depends on
the level of differentiation. First, it should be noted that when firm A chooses to bundle its
products, the firms’ market shares under collusion do not evolve in the same direction when
the degree of differentiation change. We find that differentiation reduces the market served
by firm A whereas it increases the market share of firm B. Thus, the collusive profit for
firm B is increasing with differentiation. This effect could relax the incentive for firm B to
deviate from the collusive path if the Nash profit (punishment) is low enough. This occurs
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when differentiation is not to large (β < β1). When differentiation is high (β ≥ β1), the
punishment profit for firm B is sufficiently high and increases faster than the collusive profit.
In such a case, the loss from punishment decreases faster than the benefit from deviating.
This makes a deviation from the collusive path more likely.
Now, we compare the likelihood of collusion by examining the ranking of the critical
discount factors eδA and eδB. The following Proposition gives the condition that makes
collusion sustainable under bundling.
Proposition 1 The critical discount factor that makes collusion sustainable under bundling
is given by δ ≥ eδB.
Proof. See Appendix 2
This result indicates that it will be more difficult to discipline firm B. The reason is that
firm B has a greater incentive to undercut its rival (deviation effect). Moreover, firm B has
less to fear from a possible retaliation from firm A (punishment effect). Hence, the critical
discount factor for firm B is higher than the critical discount factor for firm A.
Let us now determine how bundling affects the sustainability of collusion. As noted
above, we only consider the case where both full market coverage condition and non-negative
market shares condition are verified. In order to study the relationship between bundling
and collusion, we have to compare the critical discount factor δ∗, when firm A offers inde-
pendently product X and product Y , with the critical discount factor eδB, under bundling.
Remember that Lemma 2 shows how the critical discount factor that makes collusion
sustainable under bundling (eδB) moves with the degree of differentiation. The following
Lemma considers the impact of consumers’ valuation for product X on the threshold valueeδB.
Lemma 3 The threshold value eδB rises with α.
Proof. Using restrictions on parameters, the sign of derivative can be obtained by direct
computation.
This comparative static shows that the likelihood of collusion under bundling is decreas-
ing with the valuation of consumers for product X. The valuation α modifies both the loss
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from punishment and the benefit from deviating. The intuition is as follows. When α in-
creases, the benefit from deviating increases whereas the loss from punishment decreases. It
is clear indeed that the valuation of the monopolized product decreases the non-cooperative
market share of firm B and then reduces its profit. In the collusive equilibrium, α reduces
the collusive profit of firm B too. However, the impact on the non-cooperative profit is lower
than the impact on the collusive profit.
The following Proposition establishes the relationship between bundling and the feasi-
bility of collusion.
Proposition 2 The comparison between the two critical discount factors, eδB and δ∗, gives:
(i) eδB ≥ δ∗ if α ≥ α or β ≥ eβ2
(ii) eδB ≥ δ∗ if α ≤ α and β ≤ eβ1
(iii) eδB < δ∗ if α < α and eβ1 < β < min(eβ2, β)
Proof. Appendix 3.
This proposition establishes that the relationship between bundling and collusion sus-
tainability depends both on the level of the consumers’ valuation for product X and on the
degree of product differentiation.
The intuition behind the results is as follows. Lemma 2 gives the condition under which
differentiation may increase the critical discount factor for firm B and Lemma 3 shows that
this critical factor rises with the valuation for the monopolized product. This implies that
bundling reduces the likelihood of collusion (eδB ≥ δ∗) when consumers have a high valuation
for the monopolized product (α ≥ α) or when differentiation is high enough (β ≥ eβ2). In
other cases, there are two opposing effects at play that determine the impact of bundling
on the feasibility of collusion. Indeed, when β is lower then eβ2 the impact of differentiation
on eδB depends on the level of the threshold value β1 (see Lemma 2 )10 . It is easy to show
that the value of β1 increases with α. It turns out that when the valuation is low (α < α),
the threshold value β1 is low and eδB is more likely to increase with differentiation. On the
other hand, it is clear that collusion is more likely when the valuation is low. Thus, the
threshold value eβ1 trades off the differentiation effect with the valuation effect on eδB and
finally on the impact of bundling on collusion (eδB − δ∗). Notice therefore that the interval
[eβ1, eβ2] whithin which bundling makes a deviation more profitable decreases with α.
10Direct computation shows that eβ2 > β1.
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The following Proposition examines how bundling affects collusion when there is no
difference between valuations for product X and Y .
Proposition 3 Suppose α = 1. Bundling reduces the feasibility of collusion
Proof. Note that α = 1 > α.
In words, with bundling there is less scope for collusion if consumers have the same
valuation for both products. The intuition about why collusion becomes more difficult as α =
1 is simple. Indeed, α = 1 is sufficiently high with respect to the threshold value α to make
a deviation more profitable. In fact, by linking the monopolized market (market for product
X) with a more competitive market (market for product Y ), bundling may strengthen the
gain from deviation for firm B. That is why collusion is more difficult to sustain. It should
be noted that when α = 1 the threshold value β1 under which differentiation may reduceeδB is inside the interval [β, β] and closer to β. Therefore, since the valuation for product X
is high enough, the valuation effect offsets the potential negative effect of differentiation oneδB.
This result may have an important implication for competition policy and ex-ante reg-
ulation in network industries. The antitrust traditional view indeed regards bundling as
an anti-competitive strategy used by dominant firms. This result shows that bundling may
benefit to competition by lowering the feasibility of collusion.
4 Bundling with one-way access
In this section, we extend the paper. We consider now that firm A enters the market Y
without network access. Since, the local loop is an essential facility, the entrant must get
access from the incumbent (firm B).
For simplicity, we assume that α and β are normalized to 1, so that the valuation of both
products are equal and bundling does not rise differentiation. Let a denotes the unit access
charge which firm A pays to firm B for each unit of product Y she sells.
Firstly, we consider the case where firm A offers the two products independently. Sec-
ondly, we consider the bundling case.
Independent pricing. As above, we restrict our analysis in the case where both full
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market and duopoly conditions are verified. This requires that a1 ≤ a ≤ a2, where11
a1 = 1− 7t/2 and a2 = 1− 3t/2.
The market shares are unchanged and given by (3). The non-cooperative profits on
market Y are:
πA = (pA − a)by and πB = pB(1− by) + aby
The profits maximization give the following equilibrium prices:
p∗∗A = p∗∗B = t+ a
and profits are:
π∗∗A =
t
2
and π∗∗B =
t
2
+ a
We proceed as above to determine collusion and deviation profits. Collusion profits are
given by:
πcA =
2− t− 2a
4
and πcB =
2− t+ 2a
4
and deviation profits are:
πdA =
(2 + t− 2a)2
32t and π
d
B =
(2 + t)2 + 4a(7t− 2 + a)
32t
Using (IC),we determine easily the threshold value δ∗∗ above which collusion is feasible:
δ∗∗ = 2− 3t− 2a
2 + 5t− 2a (9)
Finally, it is easy to show that the threshold value δ∗∗ is decreasing with access charge12.
The following Lemma summarizes the result.
Lemma 4 (i) Collusion is feasible in market Y with independent pricing if δ ≥ δ∗∗
(ii) Access charge is a tool for collusion:
∂δ∗∗
∂a < 0
If the discount factor is greater than δ∗∗, collusion will be sustained. From (9) we ob-
serve that δ∗∗ is a function of access charge (a). The result (ii) shows that access charge
decreases the discount factor, making collusion more likely. This highlights the collusive
11We assume t ≤ 2/3 to have a2 ≥ 0.
12The derivative of bδ∗ is −16t
(2+5t−2a)2 < 0.
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power of access charge. This result was discussed in a recent literature in different frame-
works which have examined the possible anti-competitive use of access charges between
interconnected networks (Armstrong (1998), Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a,b), Dessein
(2004), Peitz (2004), Valletti and Cambini (2005)). In the present paper, the collusive
power of access charge appears when firm A offers product X and product Y separately.
The intuition behind this result is that an increase of access charge induces a change in
(πd−π∗) which exactly offsets the change in (πd−πc). Then, when access charge increases,
the benefit from deviating decreases faster than loss from punishment, making access charge
a tool for collusion.
Bundling. We now consider the case where firm A offers a bundle combining product
X and product Y . We assume again full market coverage and non-negative market shares
conditions for all equilibriums with bundling. Thus, restrictions on parameters are given by
a1 ≤ a ≤ a2,where13:
a1 =
9− 14t
4
and a2 =
5− 6t
4
The profit functions are:
bπA = (pA − a)bA and bπB = pB(1− bA) + abA
By following the logic that we outlined in the previous section, we can show that the
non-cooperative profits are:
bπ∗A = (1 + 3t)218t and bπ∗B = 9t2 + 1+ 18at− 6t18t
and the collusive profits are given by:
bπcA = (1 + 2t) (7− 2t− 4a)16t and bπcB = 12t− 4t2 + 4a+ 8at− 516t
The best deviations for firm A and firm B give respectively the profits:
bπdA = (9 + 2t− 4a)2128t and bπdB = 4t2 + 12t+ 9+ 16a2 + 112at− 24a128t
Using (IC), we can now determine the critical discount factors both for firm A and firm
B: bδA = − 9 (5− 6t− 4a)2
(19− 18t− 12a) (35 + 30t− 12a)
bδB = 9 (6t+ 4a− 7)2
(17− 18t− 12a) (1 + 30t− 12a)
13We assume t ≤ 5/6 to have a2 ≥ 0 and t ≥ 1/2 to have non-negative market shares.
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The following Lemma gives the critical discount value above which collusion is feasible
with bundling.
Lemma 5 With bundling, collusion is feasible if δ ≥ bδB.
Proof. See Appendix 4.
The above Lemma implies that with bundling the incentive to deviate is the greatest
for firm B. Thus, the threshold value under which collusion is not feasible is bδB. This
result is similar to the result obtain in the previous section (Proposition 1 ). However, the
sustainability of collusion depends here on the level of access charge.
It can be checked that the derivative of bδB with respect to a is:
∂bδB
∂a = 288
(7− 6t− 4a)
¡
108t2 + 72at− 132t− 36a+ 43
¢
(18t+ 12a− 17)2 (30t− 12a+ 1)2
Since a ≤ a2, it is easy to show that
¡
108t2 + 72at− 132t− 36a+ 43
¢
> 0. We can then
deduce that bδB increases with access charge.
Hence, we can summarise the above discussion in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 (i) Bundling hinders collusion (bδB > δ∗∗)
(ii) Access charge reduces the feasibility of collusion (
∂bδB
∂a > 0)
Proof. See Appendix 4.
This result shows that when the bundling firm (firm A) is using a one-way access that
an incumbent possesses (firm B), bundling always increases the ability for fim B to deviate
making less probable collusion (i). Moreover, the lower is the access charge, the more
sustainable is collusion (ii). When access charge is reduced the loss from punishment rises
faster than the benefit from deviating. Thus, in a context of tacitly collusive environnement
with bundling, the incentive of the firm which possesses the broadband access to sustain
collusion is rising when access charge is low. This result may have an important implication
on access regulation: access regulation based on simple cost recovery rules risks encouraging
collusive behaviors.
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5 Conclusion
Our analysis has shed light on the effects of bundling on the feasibility of collusion. We
looked at two cases. In the first case, we assume that the entrant owns its local access
network and then can self-supply broadband access to offer Internet services. We show how
product differentiation and the relative valuation for the monopolized product matter for
the feasibility of collusion.
In the second case, we consider that the entrant cannot self-supply local access and then
utilizes a one-way access that the incumbent owns. We focus on the impact of access charge
on the feasibility of collusion both with independent pricing and bundling. With independent
pricing, access charge appears as a tool to increase the sustainability of collusion. In contrast,
with bundling the sustainability of collusion is decreasing with the level of access charge.
This main result has an important policy implication. This implies that regulatory authority
should be careful when she regulate access price. In words, a low access charge could not be
desirable insofar as it could increase the feasibility of collusion and lead to high prices for
consumers.
This research is perfectly in line with current regulatory debates on the bundling strate-
gies in communications industries. It enables us to analyse the problems raised by conver-
gence and competition between wired and wireless networks. In this case, regulators are
looking at the effects of the bundled offerings marketed by an operator that is dominant in
the mobile market and offers fixed services in a more competitive market.
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Appendix 1
For the benchmark case (independent pricing), it is easy to show that full market coverage
and non-negative market shares under non-cooperation, collusion and deviation equilibrium
requires 2/7 ≤ t ≤ 2/3.
Let us now consider the pure bundling case.
Non-negative market shares conditions
Non-cooperative equilibrium
The market shares are given by:
eb∗A = 3βt+α6βt and ebB = 1−ebA
Each firm has a positive market share if 0 ≤ ebA ≤ 1. This requires β ≥ β1 = α/3t.
Collusion
The market shares are ebcA = α+2βt4βt and ebcB = 1 − ebcA. The condition is β ≥ β2 = α/2t.
Notice that β2 > β1.
Deviation
When firm A deviates, its market share is ebdA = 5α+4+2βt16βt . The non-negative market
share condition is then β ≥ β = 5α+414t .
When firm B deviates, each firm has a positive market share if β ≥ max(β3, β4), where
β3 = 4−α14t and β4 =
α−4
2t . Notice that β3 ≥ β4 if α ≤ 4.
Finally, to ensure non-negative market shares in all equilibriums, we must put restrictions
on parameters such that:
β ≥ β if α ≤ 2 and β ≥ β2 if α ≥ 2.
Full market coverage conditions
We have to determine in each equilibrium the restrictions on parameters which ensure
UA(y) = UB(y) ≥ 0.
Non-cooperative equilibrium
UA(eb∗A) = UB(eb∗A) ≥ 0
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⇔ β ≤ β5 = 2+α3t
Collusion
At the collusion equilibrium, the market is always fully coverade: UA(ebcA) = UB(ebcA) = 0.
Deviation
When firm A deviates, the condition is given by β ≤ β = α+46t .
When firm B deviates, the condition is given by β ≤ β6 =
3α+ 4
6t .
Notice that β < β6, β < β5 and β6 > β5.
We conclude that to ensure full market coverage in all equilibriums we must restrict
parameters on β ≤ β.
Compatibility between full market condition and non-negative market shares
To have full market coverage and non-negative market shares in all equilibriums, we must
put restrictions on parameters such that β ≤ β ≤ β and α ≤ 2.
Conditions for full market coverage and duopoly equilibrium
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Appendix 2
Proof of Proposition 1
To examine the effect of bundling on the sustainability of collusive pricing among firms,
we have to compare max{eδA,eδB}. Remember that we restrict our attention to α ≤ 2 and
β ≤ β ≤ β.
Consider the difference between the two critical factors, we have
eδA − eδB = 288H(β)D
where
D = (7α+ 12− 18βt) (23α+ 12 + 30βt) (5α+ 12− 18βt) (11α− 12− 30βt) < 0
and H(β) = −216β3t3+468t2β2 (α+ 2)−30tβ
¡
32 + 9α2 + 32α
¢
+(α+2)(47α2+144α+
144)
As D < 0, the sign of eδA−eδB is given by H(β). The derivation of H(β) with respect to
β is:
H 0(β) = −648β2t3 + 936t2β(α+ 2)− 30t(32 + 9α2 + 32α) admits two solutions:
β01 =
26 + 13α−
√
196 + 196α+ 34α2
18t
β001 =
26 + 13α+
√
196 + 196α+ 34α2
18t
and we have: H0(β) ≥ 0 if β ∈ [β01, β
00
1 ] and H 0(β) < 0 otherwise.
Moreover, we show that β01 ≥ β, H(0) > 0 and H(β) = 2α2(7α + 8) > 0. This implies
H(β) > 0 and finally eδA − eδB < 0.
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Appendix 3
Proof of Proposition 2
We have to compare the critical discount factors both under independent pricing, δ∗,
and under bundling, eδB. We show that:
eδB − δ∗ = 16NB(β)DB
where DB = − (5α+ 12− 18βt) (11α− 12− 30βt) (5t+ 2) > 0
and
NB(β) = 108β2t2 − 12tβ (3αt+ 7α+ 9t+ 6) + 15α2t+ 17α2 + 54αt+ 36α+ 72t :
We note g(α) =
¡
3α2t+ 27t+ 18αt+ α2 − 18 + 12α
¢
. A direct computation shows that
the sign of g(α) is given by:
g(α) ≤ 0 if α ≤ α = −18t− 12 + 6
√
15t+ 6
2(3t+ 1) and g(α) > 0 otherwise.
Moreover, we have g(0) = 9(3t − 2) ≤ 0 because we assume that t ≤ 2/3 to ensure full
market coverage in independent pricing.
The analysis of NB(β) with respect to β gives:
Case 1: if α ≥ α then NB(β) ≥ 0
Case 2: if α ≤ α then g(α) < 0. NB(β) = 0 has two roots given by eβ1 and eβ2:
eβ1 = 3αt+ 7α+ 9t+ 6−p(3t− 2) (3α2t+ 27t+ 18αt+ α2 − 18 + 12α)18t
eβ2 = 3αt+ 7α+ 9t+ 6 +p(3t− 2) (3α2t+ 27t+ 18αt+ α2 − 18 + 12α)18t
with eβ1 < eβ2
In this case, we show that NB(0) > 0.
We evaluate now the values of NB(β) at β = β and β = β and derivatives at these
points.
(i) Firstly, we consider β = β.
We have:
NB(β) = 157 α2t+
38
49α2 +
36
7 αt+
408
49 α+
288
7 t−
576
49
25
and we show that NB(β) has two roots given by:
α1 < 0 and α2 =
−252t− 408 + 84
√
−111t+ 20t+ 36
2(38 + 105t)
Using 2/7 ≤ t ≤ 2/3, we show that α2 < 0 and then NB(β) > 0.
The derivative of NB(β) shows that
∂NB(β)
∂β < 0.
(ii) Secondly, we consider β = β.
We have:
NB(β) = α(9αt+ 6α+ 12− 8) ≥ 0 if α ≥ eα = 4
3
2− 3t
3t+ 2
It is easy to show that 0 < eα < α and:
if α ≤ eα then NB(β) ≤ 0 and NB(β) > 0 otherwise.
The derivative of NB(β) gives:
∂NB(β)
∂β < 0 for any α ≤ α.
Finally:
- when α < eα we have:
NB(β) ≤ 0 if β ∈ [eβ1, β] and NB(β) > 0 if β ∈ [β, eβ1].
- when eα ≤ α ≤ α, we have:
NB(β) ≤ 0 if β ∈ [eβ1, eβ2] and NB(β) > 0 otherwise.
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Appendix 4
Proof of Lemme 4:
We have to compare the critical discount factors for both firm:
bδA − bδB = 288 bH(a)bD(a)
where:
bD(a) = (18t+ 12a− 19)(30t− 12a+ 35)(18t− 17 + 12a)(30t+ 1− 12a)
since a < a2, bD(a) > 0.
and
bH(a) = 288a3+(960t− 1296) a2+¡1966− 2880t+ 936t2¢ a−1005+2190t+216t3−1404t2
The derivative of bH(a) is:
bH 0(a) = 864a2 + (1920t− 2592)a+ 936t2 + 1966− 2880t
bH 0(a) = 0 has two roots given by:
ba1,2 = −10t
9
+
3
2
∓ 1
36
√
196t233
It is easy to show that ba1 < ba2 and ba1 > a2. We can deduce that bH 0(a) > 0.
Note that bH(a2) < 0 and bH(a1) < 0. Then, bH(a) < 0. Finally, bδB > bδA.
Proof of Proposition 4:
(i) We compare bδB and δ∗∗:
bδB − δ∗∗ = 16dNB(a)dDB(a)
where:
dDB(a) = (18t+ 12a− 17)(30t+ 1− 12a) < 0 since a < a2.
and
dNB(a) = 36t2 + 15t− 30ta− 53 + 89a− 36a2
We show that dNB(a) = 0 has two roots given by:
ea1,2 = −5
12
+
89
72
∓ 1
72
√
6084t2 − 3180t+ 289
It is easy to remark that ea1 < ea2 and ea1 > a2. We deduce that dNB(a) < 0 and thenbδB > δ∗∗.
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(ii) The derivative of bδB with respect to a is:
∂bδB
∂a = 288
(7− 6t− 4a)(108t2 − 132t+ 72ta+ 43− 36a)
(18t− 17 + 12a)2(30t+ 1− 12a)2
Note that since a < a2 then (7− 6t− 4a) > 0 and (108t2 − 132t+ 72ta+43− 36a) > 0.
Hence,
∂bδB
∂a > 0.
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